Shades of Amnesia
China’s leadership is fixated on combating ‘historical nihilism’—the act of failing to completely comport to the official, often positive version of history. The end game is to secure an uncontradictable narrative of China’s history that not only makes the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) look good, but also convincingly describes the country’s current successes as the indisputable outcomes of continued CCP rule. China’s ups and downs are considered, in almost faith-based fashion, part of the party’s plan. Positive developments are supposed to be the inheritance of each new generation of CCP-governed Chinese people. Negative ones, when acknowledged, are the struggles they have to undergo to earn their birthright.
The state has created a climate of positive memory preservation so powerful that in some cases, it may even exceed its own intended boundaries. For example, the patriotic blogger Wu Wanzheng is suing the writer Mo Yan on the basis that he has violated a 2018 Chinese law meant to “strengthen protections of heroes and martyrs”. Wu’s allegation is that Mo failed to write about the Japanese soldiers who occupied China with sufficiently one-dimensional disdain. He also didn’t make Mao look good enough, therefore endangering the country’s most important hero. The authorities may step in, directly or indirectly, to squelch the case if they deem it an instance of civilian overreach. But it is impossible not to see a connection between the state’s control over history and a nationalistic, perhaps overzealous, individual’s ability to sue based on a historical narrative.
In China, history is guarded yet distributed en masse. Challenges to its presentation are not tolerated, yet the state is constantly editing it—sometimes resulting in changes so severe they amount to reversals. It is one of the most emphasised subjects in schools. Organic discussions of history are curbed, yet lectures on it are decisive. In other countries, history is a force and a foundation the state and citizens reckon with—or they fail to do so and national identity becomes weakened or contested. In China, history is more like a sharp tool used by the government and the governed—both to attack one another and defend themselves.
Ian Johnson’s book, Sparks: China’s Underground Historians and Their Battle for the Future, profiles scholars and artists he calls “underground historians” who enter the taboo universe of unapproved historical research, facing risks and punishments as a result. Their work bravely challenges the party’s attempt to erase episodes from the national narrative. In a chapter titled ‘The Limits of Amnesia’, Johnson argues the Communist Party combines cultural memory (the texts and beliefs that hold a society together) and communicative memory (direct personal or intergenerational experiences) by “using myths to explain the recent past”.
Read the full article via the Mekong Review here.